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1. INTRODUCTION 
Ding and Tan [1-3], Ding et al. [4,5], Im et al. [6], Tan and Yuan [7], and Tian [8,9] have proved 
some existence theorems of equilibria for generalized games with an infinite number of agents, 
with noncompact strategy sets and with the preference correspondences which have open lower 
sections or are majorized by the correspondences with open lower sections. Tan and Yuan [10] 
proved some new existence theorems for qualitative games and generalized games with compact 
strategy sets and with the preference correspondences which are majorized by upper semicontin- 
uous correspondences. 
In this paper, some existence theorems of equilibria for noncompact qualitative games and 
for noncompact generalized games with an infinite number of agents, with noncompact strat- 
egy sets and with the preference correspondences which are majorized by upper semicontinuous 
correspondences, are proved. These theorems generalize the corresponding results of Tan and 
Yuan [10]. 
2.  PREL IMINARIES  
Let A be a nonempty subset of a topological space X. We shall denote by 2 A the family of 
all subsets of A and by clxA the closure of A in X. If  A is a nonempty subset of a vector 
space E, we shall denote by coA the convex hull of A. If S, T : A--,2 E are correspondences, then 
(SNT)  : A --, 2 E is a correspondence d fined by (SNT)(x)  = T(x) n S(x) for each x 6 A. I fX  
and Y are topological spaces and T : X --* 2 v is a correspondence, then 
(1) T is said to be upper semicontinuous on X if for each x E X and for each open set U of Y 
containing T(x), the set {z e X : T(z) C U} is an open neighborhood of x in X; 
(2) the graph of T, denoted by Gr (T), is the set {(x, y) E X x Y : y e T(x)}; 
(3) the correspondence ~ : X --* 2 v is defined by T(x)  = (y E Y : (x,y) E clx×yG(T)}. 
Let X be a topological space, Y be a nonempty subset of a vector space E, ~ : X --* E be a 
map, and ¢ : X --* 2 Y be a correspondence. Then, 
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(1) ¢ is said to be of class/40 if 
(a) for each x • X, 8(x) ~ ¢(x), and 
(b) ¢ is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values in Y; 
(2) tz  is a/40-majorant of ¢ at x if there exist an open neighborhood N(x) of x in X and 
t z  : N(x) ~ 2 Y such that 
(a) for each z E N(x), ¢(z) C tx(z), 0(z) ~ ¢~(z), and 
(b) tx is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values; 
(3) ¢ is said to be/4e-majorized if for each x e X with ¢(x) ~ 0, there exists a/g0-majorant 
tx of ¢ at x. 
In this paper, we shall deal with either the case 
(A) X = Y is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space E and O = Ix,  the 
identity map on X, or the case 
(B) X = 1-Lez X~ and 0 = ~rj : X --* Xj is the projection of X onto Xj and Y = Xj is a 
nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space. 
In both cases (A) and (B), we shall write/4 in place of/40. 
Let I be a (finite or infinite) set of agents. A generalized game is a family of quadruples 
F = (X~, A~, Bi, P~)~eI, where X~ is a nonempty subset of a topological vector space, A~, B~ : X = 
I~j6x Xj  "~ 2 X~ are constraint correspondences, and P~ : X --* 2 x~ is a preference correspondence. 
An equilibrium of F is a point ~ • X such that for each i ~ I, ~ e B~(~) and A~(~) ~ P~(&) = 0. 
Following [11], a qualitative game is a collection F = (X~,P~)~e~, where P~ : X --* 2 x' is a 
preference correspondence. A point 2 • X is said to be an equilibrium of F if P~(&) = 0 for all 
i • I .  
The following result is Theorem 2.2 of [10]. 
LEMMA 2.1. Let X be a nonempty subset of a locally convex Hansdorff topological vector space 
and D be a nonempty compact subset of X. Let P : X --, 2 D be bl-majorized. Then there exists 
a point ~ ~ coD such that P(~) = 0. 
3. EX ISTENCE OF  EQUIL IBR IA  
Now we shall prove some new existence theorems of equilibria for noncompact qualitative games 
and noncompact generalized games with any (countable or uncountable) number of agents and 
with noncompact strategy sets of agents in locally convex Hausdorff topological vector spaces in 
which either the preference correspondences are/4-majorized or the intersection ofconstraint and 
preference correspondences are/4-majorized. 
THEOREM 3.1. Let F = (X~, Pi)iel be a qualitative game such that for each i E I, 
(a) X~ is a nonempty convex subset of a local/y convex Hausdorff topological vector space and 
D~ is a nonempty compact subset of Xi, 
(b) Pi : X = I'Ij~I Xj --* 2 D' is/4-majorized, 
(c) the set E i = {x  e X : Pi(x) ~ O} is open in X,  
(d) there exists a nonempty closed convex subset F~ of Di such that FiOP~(x) ~ 0 for all x E E i. 
Then there exists a point ~ E coD = co ([Ij6l D~) such that P~(x) = 0 for all i E I. 
PROOF. Let D = ~iex  Dj. Then D is a compact subset of X -- I'Ij~z x j .  For each x 6 X, let 
I (x) = {i E I : P~(x) ~ 0}. Define a correspondence P : X --* 2 D by 
{ P.cx), if xcx) 0, 
P(x) = 0, if I(x) = 0, 
where P~l(x) = I-I j~ Fj x P~(x) for each x E X. Then for each x E X with I(x) ~ 0, P(x) ~ 0 
and hence P~(x) ~ 0 for each i E I(x). For any fixed i • I(x), we have Pi(x) ~ 0. By (b), there 
exist an open neighborhood N(x) of x in X and an/4-majorant ¢~ of P~ at x such that 
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(1) for each z • N(x),  P~(z) C ¢~(z) and zi ~ ¢i(z); 
(2) ¢~ is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values in D~. 
By the assumption, we may assume N(x)  C E ~ so that Pi(z) ~ 0 for each z • N(x).  Now define 
the correspondence (I)x : N(x)  -~ 2 D by 
Cx(z) = 1-I Fj × ¢i(z) 
j#i 
for each z in N(x).  We claim that ~)x is an/g-majorant of P at x. Indeed, for each z • N(x),  
by (1), 
P(z) = H P~(z) C P;(z) = 1-~ F jx  P~(z) c H f j  x ¢,(z) = (I)~(z) 
jel(z) j#i  j~i 
and z ¢ Cz(z), since zi ~ ¢i(z). By (b), (2), and Lemma 3 of [12], Cz : N(x)  --* 2 ° is upper 
semicontinuous with nonempty closed convex values in D. Therefore ~ is a b/-majorant of P 
at x. This shows that P is/~-majorized. By Lemma 2.1, there exists a point k • coD such that 
P(&) = 0 so that I(~) = 0. Hence, P~(~) = 0 for all i • I. 
REMARK 3.1. If for each i • I, Xi is compact convex, the condition (d) is satisfied trivially. 
Hence Theorem 3.1 generalizes Theorem 3.2 of [10] in the following ways: 
(1) Xi may not be compact, 
(2) the set E i = {x • X : Pi(x) ¢ 0} may not be paracompact. 
COROLLARY 3.1. Let F = (Xi, P~)~Et be a qualitative game such that for each i • I, 
(a) Xi is a nonempty compact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector 
space, 
(b) Pi : X = YLeI x i  -* 2 x' is 14-majorized, 
(c) the set E'  = {x • X :  P~(x) ~ 0} is open in X .  
Then F has an equilibrimm point ~ • X.  
REMARK 3.2. Corollary 3.1 improves Theorem 3.2 of [10], the set E i may not be paracompact. 
THEOREM 3.2. Let F = ( Xi, Ai, Bi, Pi )~ex be a generalized game (= abstract economy) such that 
for each i E I, 
(a) Xi is a nonempty convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space E~ 
and Di is a nonempty compact subset of Xi, 
(b) for each x e X = l-IieI Xi, Ai(x) is nonempty, Ai(x) c Bi(x) C Di, and Bi(x) is convex, 
(c) the set E i = {x e X : Ai(x) n Pi(z) ¢ O} is open in X,  
(d) Ai A Pi : X -~ 2 9` is bl-majorized, 
(e) there exists a nonempty closed convex set Ki C D~ such that for each x e E ~ M Fi, (Ai M 
Pi)(x) M Ki ¢ 0 and for each x • X \ Fi, Bi(x) M Ki ~ 0, where F~ = {x • X : z • Bi(x)}. 
Then F has an equilibrium point ~ • coD = co (l-Lei Di), i.e., ki • Bi(x) and Ai(~) N Pi(k) = 0 
for each i • I. 
PROOF. For each i E I, by the definition of B~, Bi has closed graph and hence F~ is closed in X. 
Define a correspondence Qi : X --~ 2 D' by 
{ Ai(x) M P~(x), if z E Fi, 
Qi(x) = -Bi(x), if x ~ F~. 
We shall prove that the qualitative game F = (Xi, Q~)iel satisfies all hypotheses of Theorem 3.1. 
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For each i ~ I, we have 
{x ~ X : Q~(x) # ~} = {X \ Fi : Qi(x) # ~} u {x e Fi : Qi(x) # ~) 
= (x  \ F~) u {z e F~: (A~ ~ Pal(x) # ~} 
= (X \ Fd u (F~ ~ E ~) 
= (X \F , )UE  i. 
Hence the set {x E X : Qi(x) # ~} is open in X. For any fixed i ~ I, let x q X be such that 
Qi(x) # ~. If  x ¢ Fi, then x e N(x)  = X \ Fi and N(x)  is an open neighborhood of x. Define a 
correspondence ¢= : N(x)  ---* 2 D by 
¢~(z) = Bi(z), for each z ~ N(x). 
Then we have Q~(z) = Bi(z) and zi ¢ Qi(z) for each z E N(x) by the definition of Fi. By 
Proposition 3.1.9 of [13], ¢~ = B~ is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values. Therefore 
Cz = Bi is a U-majorant of Q~ at x. I fx  E F~, then Qi(x) = Ai(x) nPi(x) # 0. By condition (d), 
there exist an open neighborhood N1 (x) of x in X and a b/-majorant Cx : NI (x) --* 2 ° such that 
Qi(z) = Ai(z) NPi(z) c Cx(z) and zi ¢ ¢z(z) for each z ~ Nl(x), and Cx : Nl(X) --* 2 D is upper 
semicontinuous with closed convex values. Hence ¢~ is a H-majorant of Q~ at x. Therefore Qi 
is a/4-majorized correspondence. Now let x ~ X with Qi(x) # {~, then x ~ (X \ Fi) U {z e Fi : 
(A~ n P~)(z) # ¢}. It follows from assumption (e) that Qi(x) cl Ki # 0. Hence all hypotheses of
Theorem 3.1 are satisfied so that there exists a point ~ E coD such that Qi(~) = ~) for all i q I. 
By condition (b), this implies that for each i ~ I, ~ ~ Bi(~) and Ai(~) f3 Pi(~) = 0. 
REMARK 3.3. If Xi is compact convex for each i e I, then condition (e) of Theorem 3.2 is 
satisfied by letting Xi = D~ = Ki for each i e I. Hence Theorem 3.2 generalizes Theorem 3.1 
of [10] in the following ways: 
(1) Xi may not be compact, 
(2) the set E ~ = {x ~ X : A~(x) tq P~(x) # ¢} may not be paracompact. 
COROLLARY 3.2. Let r = (X~, A~, Bi, Pi)~ez be a genera//zed game such that for each i E I, 
(a) X~ is a nonempty compact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector 
space E~, 
(b) for each x E X = 1-[~ez Xi, A~(x) is nonempty, Ai(x) C Bi(x), and Bi(x) is convex, 
(c) Ai f3 Pi : X --* 2 x` is Ll-majorized. 
Then r has an equilibrium point, i.e., there exists a point & E X such that for each i E I, 
~ e -g~(e) and A~(z) n PJx) = 0. 
REMARK 3.4. Corollary 3.2 improves Theorem 3.1 of [I0]. 
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